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Abstract:  Free elections, reform of the constitution, reform initiatives, political 
prisons, emergency law: the usual ingredients of the Egyptian political scene. 
Does all this lead to a process of democratization? While the regime is widening, 
can democracy work without mass participation? Is democracy a procedure or a 
nationwide project? Can democratization work under emergency laws? Can 
democratization work from above?  This paper aims to provide an in-depth 




On May 25th a nationwide referendum is taking place on a constitutional 
amendment that allows many candidates to run for presidency, changing the old 
system in which one person - Hosny Mubarak - is nominated by the parliament 
and is presented to the nation through a referendum. Although this step would 
appear to a distant viewer a large step on the road of pluralism and democracy 
that should be applauded, this referendum is taking place amidst a call by many 
opposition parties and groups for boycott. This amendment has failed to address 
the desire of such groups for a real democracy in which the people can finally 
have effective participation in the Egyptian politics. In order to achieve real 
democracy, it is not enough to adopt democratic rhetoric or to install superficial 
reforms that allow limited pluralism.   Democracy is an end result of a building 
process through which the people or the politicians build their polity, determine its 
structure. By examining the meaning of democracy, its structure, the process of 
building this structure and its underlying infra-structure, and contrasting this to 
what is currently happening in Egypt, it would be clear that the so called 
“reforms” the Egyptian government is carrying out are, in fact, not real 
“democratization”. 
 
What is Democracy? 
Democracy is the rule of the people. This leads to the question of how the people 
would rule themselves - directly, by representation, or by willingly submitting to a 
ruler? The discourse thus evolving is about the structure through which it is 
assumed that people would rule themselves. 
 
In the classical Greek tradition, democracy is the form of government in which all 
free adult male citizens would go to the people’s council to take political 
decisions.  However, with increasing population, this became impractical. The 
idea then became that instead of allowing the people to take decisions, they can 
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be allowed to choose the people who will take decisions.  This form of 




Liberal democracy can be defined as a form of “representative democracy” 
where representatives are elected, and the constitution emphasizes the rights of 
minorities and individual liberties - principles of private property, law and 
individualism. It also depends on certain institutions that mediate and ensure 
political participation and monitor the work of the government, ensuring that 
people get their liberal rights.  
 
The main type of institutions and organizations on which liberal democracy is 
based are civil society institutions. Civil society is the structure that ensures that 
the government is really based on people and on their participation. That is 
because liberal democracy differs from the classical direct democracy in the fact 
that there is a polity that is different from the people, while in theories of direct 
democracies there is no such dichotomy - the citizens "are on the one hand 
sovereign and on the other subject”1. 
 
The Building of Liberal Democracy:  A Historic and Theoretical Framework 
Therefore, modern liberal democracy is based on certain concepts and 
institutions that ensure that the polity is connected to the people, represents them 
and protects their rights.  Both the concepts and the institutions are products of 
the western experience.  On one side, liberal concepts could be traced back to 
western philosophers like John Locke and John Stuart Mill. On the other side the 
creation of the liberal institutions (whether on the level of the polity as in liberal 
parliaments or the public level as in the civil society) cannot be isolated from the 
western experience, in general, and western revolutions in particular. This does 
not only highlight the specific cultural context of liberal democracy, but also 
points out the fact that democracy is to be built through a long experience (as 
argued in detail later). 
 
The western liberal state structure has been the end product of a series of wars 
that redrew both the state structure and the map for several times. The result of 
this process was not only the development of nation-states, but also the need to 
establish a legitimacy that at least would allow the ruler to tax his people to 
finance their wars2.    Through the process of wars and revolutions, “rulers 
realized that the promotion of development was vital to their survival”3. They had 
to build a “bureaucratic state” that rests on the people as a source of structure 
and legitimacy4. In this way the infrastructure for the western model of the state 
was laid down. The liberal institutions were mainly a result of the western 
revolutions. Revolutions and wars did not only redistribute power in the system 
and create the liberal structure, but also were a determinant factor in achieving 
legitimacy of the state. The fact that people shed their blood in the wars that 
founded the state, and participated themselves in revolutions that established the 
 1
2
The Undergraduate Research Journal, Vol. 1 [2005], Art. 5
https://fount.aucegypt.edu/urje/vol1/iss1/5
state structure, made the state legitimate in their eyes5.  Furthermore, these 
revolutions united various classes under a common goal, and therefore, created 
an organization with which most of the people (everybody except the old 
aristocracy) identified and had an interest in, laying the foundations for the 
modern state6. This modern state was the structure in which liberal democracy 
was built, and the stratification of classes in these revolutions, entailing the 
stratification of power among them, was a main factor behind the emergence of 
liberal democracy7. 
 
The Role of Mass Mobilization in Building Democracies 
Mass mobilization therefore has been an important factor in building western 
liberal democracies. It is natural that the building of the structure which will allow 
the people to participate requires the participation of people, so that it becomes 
really their structure: built in a way to ensure their participation and that suits 
them and their culture. Having someone else building it for them would be futile. 
First, because politics is a game of power, having someone else build the 
structure means that this someone has the power. People might be then allowed 
to participate through this framework, but it is not likely that the power will be 
given to them. This can apply to the relatively liberal framework established by 
former Egyptian President, Anwar El Sadat. Sadat allowed for political parties 
and a parliament to exist. However, because the process was undertaken by him 
and not by the people, he still had power over it. He never allowed the political 
parties to have real power, and once they tried, he put an end to the process and 
put all the opposition figures in prison.  
 
This can explain the importance of mass movements in the building of 
democracy. Mass mobilization mainly stresses the power of the people8. It 
pressures the political elite, both ruling and opposition, to consider and take 
forward the demands of the people9. If there is a “bargaining table”10 between the 
government and the opposition leaders, the people push their own demands to 
this table. This does not only create a structure for democracy but also saves 
democracy from being monopolized by the elite, by providing a constant popular 
pressure on this elite. It also acts as a power reservoir for the opposition elites 
and gives them credibility (by proving that their demands are being supported). 
Simply, it shows that the public can be mobilized against the government.   
Sometimes this means that democracy is the “survival option” for the regime11. 
Furthermore, in the presence of the people-polity dichotomy (as in liberal 
democracies), mass mobilization is one factor that monitors the work of the 
representatives, making sure they do represent the people, and pressuring them 
to do so when necessary.  Mass mobilization, or its potentiality, gives continuity 
to the link between the people and their representatives, that otherwise would 
only be present during elections.  Finally, when mass mobilization is a part of the 
state building process, it assures that this state has stemmed from the people 
and therefore would make it more likely for the state to represent those people 
and for the people to consider the state legitimate. 
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What Happened in the Arab World 
This pattern of state building by the hands of the people was not the case in the 
Arab world. Instead of being built by the people, the states were built by the 
colonial powers; they “came into being virtually overnight”12. The states were not 
built by their people (as in the western model of wars and revolutions discussed 
earlier) but “sovereignty was won by, or endowed on, former colonial units”13. 
This does not only mean that they lacked legitimacy, but also that they were not 
based on the people but on the outside. The mere structure of the state is 
therefore not built on the people. That is why we see the rulers more concerned 
with their image in front of the outside world rather than their image in front of 
their people.  That is why it is no wonder that the latest reforms are done 
because of external pressure14. Internal pressure has no significance for 
Mubarak. His state was built by the outside world and therefore his legitimacy is 
based on the outside world15.  
 
The problem with reforms made for an image is that they can be a façade and 
still project a good image. This is the case with the suggested constitutional 
amendment. By virtue of this amendment, parties are allowed to nominate 
candidates. However the government is sure not to give a political movement 
with real weight the license to become a political party.  Giving licenses is the 
sovereign responsibility of the High Council for Parties, which is a committee of 
the Shura council, controlled by the ruling National Democratic Party.  Also, 
although it seems reasonable to require the signature of a certain number of the 
members of the supposedly elected councils to allow someone to run for 
presidential elections (as stated in the suggested amendment), elections for 
these councils are being controlled by the government (as discussed later on). 
After all, even without forgery of elections, the state still have the state of 
emergency law activated, by virtue of which the ministry of interior can arrest 
anybody without providing a reason. This means that they have the power to 
arrest the presidential candidates and their supporters the night before the 
elections. This illustrates how shallow reforms can project a democratic image, 
while the lack of underlying infrastructure for democracy prevents the shallow 
reforms from leading to real democratization. 
   
The Democratic Infra-structure     
Liberal democracy is based on a certain liberal infrastructure that guarantees 
representation, social welfare, and popular participation. Therefore, to be able to 
apply democracy, Egypt needs to develop an infra-structure on which it can build 
a form of government that can represent and empower the people and, therefore, 
which we can call democracy. The most important of the liberal infrastructures is 
civil society. 
 
Civil society is defined by London School of Economics and Political Science as:  
the arena of uncoerced collective action around shared interests, 
purposes and values often populated by organisations such as registered 
charities, development non-governmental organisations, community 
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groups, women's organisations, faith-based organisations, professional 
associations, trade unions, self-help groups, social movements, business 
associations, coalitions and advocacy group.16  
 
According to London School of Economics and Political Science  “In theory, its 
institutional forms are distinct from those of the state, family and market, though 
in practice, the boundaries between state, civil society, family and market are 
often complex, blurred and negotiated”17.   
 
Based on this definition, civil society can include philanthropy organizations, 
unions, cultural and communal activities, and even “organized religion”18. 
Regardless of the definition, civil society is the structure that arises from the 
people (on the grass roots level) and links between the people and the polity. It is 
therefore a product of the society itself. The main feature of such organizations 
would be that the people are comfortable with them and can participate easily 
through them. 
 
Therefore, liberal democracy needs civil society. Under the people-polity 
dichotomy that is present in liberal democracies, civil society is one of the factors 
that maintain popular participation in the polity, and maintain the link between the 
state and the people, i.e. guarantees that liberal democracy remains a 
democracy. Without civil society, there is a big danger that the polity gets 
detached from the people and the representative function of the government gets 
impaired.  
 
Academics do stress the fact that Egypt, as well as the Arab world, is in need of 
a civil society to act as a base for democracy19. However, what these academics 
are missing is that civil society is what empowered and integrated western 
people in a polity that became – due to this empowerment – a liberal democracy. 
To achieve a form of democracy in Egypt, the polity needs to integrate not 
western people but Egyptian ones. Exact emulation of the western civil society 
might therefore not lead to integrating the people in the polity, as people will not 
be likely to identify with structures created in the west.  On the other side, 
alternative organizations, assemblies and institutions that stem from the Egyptian 
culture and society might be able to achieve the goals of civil society in the 
Egyptian cultural pretext, and therefore would be more successful in giving birth 
to a form of government in which people participate: a democracy. 
 
Can we produce our own version?  Traditional values and organizations, mainly 
Islamic ones, have been successful in mobilizing people, and in forming a sphere 
that entailed voluntary participation of the people and offered some sort of a 
social welfare network, manifested in “private mosques health clinics, schools, 
banks and investment companies”20. These institutions, however, are, unlike the 
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Does this mean that these institutions are civil society? On one hand Carrie 
Wickham, a researcher who conducted a field study about the political life in 
Egypt, argues that they are not; “at least not in the liberal conception”22, mainly 
because they are “independent sites of social and political expression within an 
authoritarian setting;” while she believes civil society should not be “outside the 
government” but “endowed with a legally mandated autonomy”23. One could add 
another objection - that the religious nature of such institutions contradicts with 
the secular nature of liberalism. 
 
However, the point behind the effectiveness of such organizations and values is 
that they are not western civil societies, but they are an alternative that stemmed 
from the Egyptian society and culture. They are different, and their difference is 
what comprises the difference between the western experience and the Egyptian 
possible experience.  For example, the fact that unlike western civil society, the 
Egyptian alternative is outside the official political sphere, can be attributed to the 
fact that unlike the western states, the Egyptian (and other Arab states) has 
neither evolved from the society, nor gained legitimacy (and therefore the 
unofficial sphere is as legitimate as, if not more legitimate than, the official 
sphere); nor  has it allowed in its official sphere a chance for mass participation 
(the fact that the government refuses to legitimize such institutions, and that they 
sometimes fight them, despite of the apolitical nature of some, reveals how the 
government refuses to allow in its official sphere mass participation). This does 
not mean that they are not civil society. After all “Civil society commonly 
embraces a diversity of spaces, actors and institutional forms, varying in their 
degree of formality, autonomy and power”24. 
 
Furthermore, the difference between the Islamic nature of such organizations, 
and the secular nature of their western counterpart, reveals the difference in 
culture between the Egyptian society and the western societies. After all, 
secularism is one of the end products of the western experience25.  Nevertheless, 
“faith based organizations” are included in the London School of Economics 
definition26, and “organized religion” is given as an example for civil society27. 
 
Therefore, traditionalist and Islamic institutions are an Islamic/Arab version of the 
civil society. They are therefore apt to lead to an Egyptian kind of democracy just 
the way civil society lead to and maintained western liberal democracy. As 
Wickham herself noted “the vision of Medina, the paradigmatic Islamic state, can 
be as powerful as liberal democracy in the envisioning of, and purposeful striving 
towards, alternatives to present forms of military-bureaucratic rule.”28 Instead of 
judging these institutions using the western standards, we should study whether 
these institutions can empower and/or represent the people to form a basis of a 
form of government that would not be necessarily similar to western liberal 
democracy, yet similar in the fact that the people are empowered and/or 
represented and are at the same time analogous with our culture and society.  A 
possible area for further research is how traditional and/or Islamic organizations 
can form a social network that ensures participation and welfare. Present 
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literature focuses more on Islamic institutions. However research should also 
examine other traditional organizations, such as families and tribes (given the 
“blurred boundaries” between civil society from one side and the family on the 
other29) and examine the extent to which such organizations can offer a civil 
society30.  On the other side, academics can talk as much as they will about civil 
society, but such a notion is meaningless until it means something to the people 
to whom it is aimed to empower.  
 
Liberal Democracy and the Arab World 
Liberal democracy, the model for democracy that is now imposed by the western 
discourse, is clearly built on an infrastructure that is related to the western 
experience and western culture. Democracy is not a consumer product. While it 
is constructive to view cultural/political products of the west with admiration and 
try to achieve similar ones, directly importing them might be destructive. Imported 
democracy, without the presence of a social and cultural infrastructure would 
doom democracy to remain a shallow process which does not reach deeply in 
the society. For example, liberal democracy without ensuring links between the 
polity and the people (as in civil society and other mechanisms that would ensure 
continuous contact between the people and their representatives like mass 
mobilization) would further emphasize the people-polity dichotomy and would 
weaken representation and turn it into a cover for yet another authoritarian form 
of rule.  
 
Arguably, this is what happened in the Arab world. The western, seemingly 
liberal crust, was a cover for an authoritarian core. Bernard Lewis, the famous 
orientalist academic, laments the fact that modernization did not work in the 
Muslim world, pointing out the fact that the only relatively successful western-
styled modern regimes were the most oppressive ones31. However, the fact that 
western modern regimes had to be dictatorships in order to succeed, points to a 
very interesting fact: that such western-style modernization did not appeal to the 
people, and therefore had to be imposed on them. As Lewis himself points out; 
this modernization was imposed either by “departing imperialists” or “innovative 
native reformers”32.  In the first case, it is another country that imposed the 
western model, and therefore it could not be considered democratic. In the 
second case, Lewis uses the examples of Ataturk in Turkey, one of the most 
ruthless dictators the region has ever witnessed33.  Because of the fact that the 
western paradigm of modernization and democracy is built on a western 
infrastructure meant that applying this paradigm of modernization needed the 
imposition of the western social infrastructure. This contradicts with the idea of 
the people ruling themselves and cannot be called a democracy. This may 
explain the phenomenon Lewis laments, that the application of modernization in 
the Arab/Muslim world lead to dictatorship. 
 
On the other side, Tim Niblock, a British scholar states that “there is no reason to 
believe that it [modernization theory] explains the slow pace of democratization in 
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uses it. The fact that Arabs lack the “socio-economic prerequisites for liberal 
democracy”35 should mean that they should look for a basis for “socio-economic 
prerequisites” in their society and culture and build on them their democracy, 
which will not be necessarily the western form of liberal democracy. 
 
Without building an authentic infrastructure, the democratic procedures would 
help some voices within the society to be heard, but it will not ensure that the 
voice of the people in general would be heard, and would not assure the people 
that their voice will have a real decision making power.  It is not enough to have 
the pluralistic procedure to have democracy. The building process in itself is also 
necessary. 
 
Process or Procedure 
Is democracy just a procedure of free elections and representation? Or is it a 
wider process in which a civil and cultural infra-structure is being built to let the 
voice of the people be heard and obeyed? Is a decision from above to allow freer 
elections or to give more freedom to the press enough to assure that the people 
do rule? While some claim that democratization does not need an “infra-
structure” and that “democracy is not about substance but about procedure” 
arguing that democracy is just a “choice taken by the political elite”36 others 
argue that democracy is being used “as a slogan”, and that we are ignoring what 
is underneath it37. To them democratization is a “process” which is “long and 
costly”38. To such minded people, democracy should be rooted in the society and 
its “political culture”39.   
 
From the previous discussion, it appears that democracy is an end result of the 
nation-building process that gives rise to a social infrastructure. Without this 
social infrastructure, people will not get empowered to participate and be 




Democracy and Pluralism 
Pluralism could be defined as “a framework of interaction in which groups show 
sufficient respect and tolerance of each other, that they fruitfully coexist and 
interact without conflict or assimilation”40. Therefore, pluralism could be 
considered a framework through which different factors of the society co-exist 
and make their voices heard. This is not sufficient for democracy, as democracy 
requires that the people are empowered enough so that their will is interpreted as 
state decisions.  Pluralism is just a procedure to allow civil factors (parties, civil 
society, or simply people) to participate. This means that those civil factors 
should be powerful enough to make a difference. Pluralism is only one of the 
many factors that are required to mediate participation, which in turn is an 
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Pluralism is apt to lead to democracy, only if there is enough infrastructure to 
make the people participate through this framework, and if this participation can 
gain power (for example by not having a higher authority blocking the decisions 
taken through the pluralistic framwork).  The two conditions are interlinked, 
because when there is a structure to empower the people, then it is likely that 
their voice gains power. This power is a result of the momentum people gain 
through public action and through being ready to go forward with political action 
to assert their power. Pluralism therefore could be considered a prerequisite for 
democracy, but it is not the same as democracy. 
 
Democracy is therefore not only about pluralistic procedures but is also a “highly 
contingent process that is fraught with considerable uncertainty”42. When the 
meaning of democratization is restricted to pluralism, the power of democracy 
can still be within the hands of the elites. In such a case, only the already 
powerful elite would participate and have an effect on state decisions. 
Furthermore, this means that the state still has power over the people and over 
the pluralistic procedure and can at once stop it, as when Sadat stopped the 
pluralistic experience once it was used to voice criticism against him.  
 
In fact, pluralism in the Arab world has been a “tactical” decision taken by 
governments as a “response to crises”43 (crises such as the current US pressure 
coupled with the popular unrest). On this, one could base the argument that the 
suggested amendment for the constitution is nothing but a superficial and 
shallow procedure that fails to address the keys for democracy. Under the lack of 
an authentic infrastructure, reforms have failed in achieving the government of 
the people. The suggested amendment has only led to a shallow procedure of 
pluralism in which people can vote, have parliaments and in which some voices 
can be heard, without real popular rule.  
 
Egypt’s Controlled Pluralism 
The state structure in Egypt is a clear example of a case of pluralism that is 
controlled from above and, therefore, does not lead to the transfer of the power 
to the people. This structure started at the hands of Sadat, when he allowed for 
political parties. Before that, Egypt was a one party system in which the 
parliament was controlled by the ruling party, yet some independents managed 
to make it to the parliament. Although Sadat opened the door for the founding 
political parties, his laws stated that a party would not get license unless it 
already has a certain number of members in the parliament, i.e. parties had to 
have members in the parliament before coming into being. Furthermore, Sadat 
centered the system around himself in a manner that gave him a lot of powers 
(like the power to nominate himself for as many times as he willed, together with 
his power over the security apparatus, by which he arrested all political activists 
shortly before his death). Mubarak maintained the system he inherited from 
Sadat, and kept a similar control over the security apparatus through the 
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The Egyptian state has developed many mechanisms to maintain control over 
the political process even with the presence of a pluralistic procedure44. The most 
significant of these mechanisms is the state of emergency law, by virtue of which 
the government can arrest anybody, prevent assemblies, and the president can 
issue decrees bearing the power of law. Simply, the emergency law limits the 
power of the people to act (by preventing them from assembly and by threatening 
them of being arrested once they take political action) and increases the power of 
the president and his security apparatus. Another mechanism is the strong 
control the state exerts over the bureaucracy. To any close observer of the 
Egyptian government, power and decision making have a very clear line that 
originates from the president45.  A third mechanism is limiting the power of the 
representative bodies and mechanisms. This is clear in the privileges the 
president used to enjoy, including the right to re-elect himself for as much as he 
wanted, and his power to dissolve the parliament. Even pluralism has been 
limited in Egypt. However, right now it seems that as a result of external pressure 
the last mechanism is being taken away from the government, which means that 
the government would be apt to rely more heavily on the first two. 
 
This strong control that the Egyptian government maintains over the political 
process, means that it is able to control, for example, elections. Through the 
strong state security that is controlled by the president and his regime, and that 
has wide powers under the security law, it becomes easy for the state to fence 
election booths and prevent unwanted voters from entering46.  
 
As long as such control is maintained, amending the constitution and increasing 
the pluralistic space is void. Until now, even if free presidential and parliamentary 
elections take place (which is not even the case as the candidates are still 
controlled), and even if there is no falsification of the elections, still the state 
would have the power to arrest voters and candidates, prevent candidates from 
presenting their programs (through the ban on assemblies under the emergency 
law) and prevent people from voicing their opinions and carrying out their will. 
 
Conclusion 
Consequently, no real democratization taking place in Egypt. There has been no 
attempt to build an authentic infrastructure and mobilize the people or link to 
them. Never has there been a genuine attempt to transfer political power to the 
people. Reforms have been initiated not to empower the people but to project a 
good image to the west, as a response to western pressure for reforms - just as 
the paradigmatic discourse is designed to suit the west and not the Egyptian 
society. With the lack of an infra-structure for integrating and empowering the 
people, pluralism became a shallow procedure that does not reach the people 
nor echo their voices. In order to really democratize, the Egyptian state has to be 
ready to let go of its unchecked powers. However, until now the Egyptian state is 
not ready to do that. The only hope for democratization is that the Egyptian 
people develop their own infrastructure for their own type of democracy, and then 
be able to recover their overdue power.  
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